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Abstract
Prospective Parent Disagreement is an important issue in bioethics that has been upstaged
by the related debate on abortion. Of the few pieces of literature that focus directly on
this topic, perhaps none is better known than Christine Overall’s controversial book Why
Have Children?: The Ethical Debate. In the third chapter, Overall discusses both
manifestations of prospective parent disagreement, and she makes an argument that
fathers should always be held financially responsible for the child their sperm creates,
even in the case where the father does not want the baby. She justifies this claim by
suggesting that the procreative asymmetry inherent in prospective parent disagreement is
justified by the asymmetry displayed by each parent’s workload during pregnancy. She
further claims that this dynamic holds true even in cases of deceit and purloined sperm,
because the child’s interests always trump the financial interests of the father. This paper
disputes Overall’s analysis of prospective parent disagreement by contending that her
argument relies upon victim-blaming and misconceived notions of future asymmetries to
succeed. Firstly, I argue that Overall’s argument for the purloined sperm case relies on
an unfeasible, excessively cynical worldview and the psychological fallacy of victimblaming to succeed. Secondly, I convey how the inseminator did act responsibly in the
purloined sperm case and why this invalidates any potential financial responsibility he
might have towards the resulting child. Furthermore, I draw an analogy between the
inseminator of the purloined sperm case and traditional sperm donors, and I argue that
there is no morally relevant distinction between the two subjects if the child’s interests
and well-being always trump the financial interests of the father. Finally, I argue that
Overall mistakes a future, potential asymmetry in the procreative workload as
justification for the procreative asymmetry inherent in prospective parent disagreement,
and I offer a possible solution to quell this procreative asymmetry while respecting the
procreative, bodily, and genetic rights of both the gestator and inseminator.
Keywords: prospective parent disagreement, purloined sperm, victim-blaming, father’s
rights, procreative asymmetry, autonomy, genetic rights

Introduction
In her book Why Have Children?: The Ethical Debate, Christine Overall
dedicates a chapter to discussing problems of prospective parent disagreement. In this
chapter, she analyzes two separate disagreements that occur between prospective parents:
when the gestator wants the baby and the inseminator does not, and when the inseminator
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wants the baby and the gestator does not.1 In analysis of the former disagreement,
Overall suggests that the inseminator is always at least financially responsible for the
resulting child, even when the inseminator insists upon an abortion. Overall maintains
this position by arguing for two claims: 1) the procreative asymmetry inherent in
prospective parent disagreement is justified due to the asymmetry displayed in the
procreative workload of the gestator and inseminator during pregnancy, and 2) the child’s
interests and well-being always trump the father’s interest, specifically financial interests,
in not being a parent (Overall 2012: 40-2). The first claim allows the gestator to deny the
inseminator’s wish for an abortion, and the second claim insures that the inseminator is
financially responsible for the child after birth.
Overall even goes as far as stating that this dynamic still holds in cases of gestator
deceit and “purloined sperm,” the situation where the gestator steals the inseminator’s
sperm, unbeknownst to him, and impregnates herself. Combined with the first two
claims, she argues for a third, stronger claim: 3) in cases of deceit and purloined sperm, it
is the inseminator’s own negligence and lack of responsibility that makes the pregnancy
possible, so the gestator’s deceit does not let the inseminator “off the hook” from his
financial responsibilities for the impending child (Overall 2012: 46-7).
In this paper, I argue that Overall’s claims are unfounded, and, with these claims
nullified, there is no justifying reason to override the inseminator’s procreative
autonomy, financial interests, and genetic rights in this manifestation of prospective
parent disagreement. The paper commences with the purloined sperm case, because the

1

Throughout the paper I shall refer to the prospective parents as the gestator and inseminator. Overall uses
these terms because the labels “mother” and “father” tend to beg the question, so I will also stick with the
labels she prefers (Overall 2012: 35).
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arguments brought against Overall’s third claim set up the argument for cases of nondeceitful prospective parent disagreement nicely. Firstly, I attack the third claim as a
case of unrealistic expectations, and I describe how it is more akin to an excessive
cynicism than responsible, risk-averse behavior. Secondly, I argue that Overall shifts her
emphasis from the child’s interests and well-being to punishing and blaming the
inseminator for his alleged irresponsibility. This is the psychological fallacy of blaming
the victim, and it is unwarranted, which dissolves the purloined sperm case. 2 Next, I
argue that Overall’s second claim also applies equally to sperm donation, and acceptance
of this claim would challenge some common-sense notions of a sperm donator’s
responsibility. Finally, I analyze the problem of procreative asymmetry and describe how
Overall’s defense of the asymmetry depends upon a misconceived notion of a future
asymmetry in the procreative workload.

The Purloined Sperm Case: Excessive Cynicism
The purloined sperm case is a staple in the miniscule literature that is prospective
parent disagreement, because it vividly describes the asymmetry inherent in our current
understanding of the rights of the gestator versus the rights of the inseminator. These
types of situations are also starting to become actualized in the real world too with the
emergence of sperm banks and advanced barrier methods of contraception. In fact, in
2000 an Illinois Appellate Court actually presided over a case of purloined sperm. It was

2

This logical terminology is justified here, because victim-blaming is commonly referred to as a
psychological fallacy of the just-world hypothesis. For example, Richard Double states it as such,
“Psychologists and common sense recognize blaming the victim as a cognitive error (fallacy) that many of
us use to support the just-world hypothesis — the view that life is basically fair” (Double 2005: 21).

Potter, Jordan G., 2014, UMSL, p. 5

found that Dr. Sharon Irons artificially inseminated herself with Dr. Richard Phillips’
sperm that was attained through oral sex with a condom. Irons, who was married to
another man at the time, began a sexual relationship with Phillips in 1999. The two never
engaged in sexual intercourse, but Irons did perform oral sex with a male condom on
Phillips on three different occasions. Without Phillips consenting, Irons promptly used
the sperm within the condom to artificially inseminate herself and become pregnant
(Turley 2011). 3
In discussing the purloined sperm case in general, Overall first condemns the
woman for deceiving the man. She rightly judges the action as wrong, and explicitly
states that the woman has no right to deceive him. However, she suggests that the
trickery played on the inseminator is not the most relevant fact here in determining what
to do in cases of disagreement. Rather, she argues that the child’s interests and wellbeing, in conjunction with the inseminator’s gamete negligence, trump the deceit used by
the mother. She states:
...absolving the inseminator of any parental responsibilities if he does not want
them, simply means that the child pays for the gestator’s deception. The infant
had no involvement in or choice about coming into existence. It is also not in the
baby’s interests for the inseminator to be absolved of all moral and economic
responsibility resulting from sexual activity in which the inseminator chose to
participate. I suggest that the child’s interests in being well supported and cared
3

After being notified eighteen months later through a petition to determine paternity, Phillips sued Irons on
the grounds of emotional distress and conversion of property. The Illinois Appellate Court denied the
conversion of property suit claiming, “…that when the plaintiff ‘delivered’ his sperm, it was a gift – an
absolute and irrevocable transfer of title to property from a donor to a done. There was no agreement that
the original deposit would be returned upon request” (Phillips v. Irons 2005). The court did allow the
emotional distress suit to continue forward, though it was eventually ruled out, and the judges did state that
Irons “deceitfully engaged in sexual acts, which no reasonable person would expect could result in
pregnancy, to use plaintiff’s sperm in an unorthodox, unanticipated manner yielding extreme
consequences.” However, even though the court ruled that the purloining of sperm was deceitful and unable
to be anticipated, Phillips was still ordered to pay $800 a month in child support for his child conceived by
deception (Turley 2011).
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for must trump the inseminator’s interests in not being a parent (Overall 2012:
42).

Overall claims that the deception used to engender the child should not be something that
is held against the child. She shouldn’t have to suffer due to a vicious act of the gestator
and the inseminator’s interest in not being a parent. This at least seems plausible.
Though deception was used, it seems intuitive that we have the duty to protect innocents,
especially babies and infants, from avoidable suffering and misfortune, and it could easily
be argued that the inseminator’s unwillingness to be financially responsible for the child
would cause avoidable, unneeded suffering and misfortune.
If the argument had ended there, her claims would not seem so radical. However,
after classifying some outliers that would not be morally and financially responsible in
this case, such as pubescent boys and the mentally impaired, she makes the claim that
financial responsibility derives from this man knowing that a child might result from the
oral sex. She says:
Rather, the claim is that when consent is knowledgeable and unconstrained,
unimpaired adult men do in fact know that a child might result from their sexual
activity, and therefore they ought to be held responsible for its consequences
(Overall 2012: 44-5).

A couple sentences later she explicitly states that “...the fact that a man does not
anticipate a pregnancy as a result of oral sex is not a defense” (Overall 2012: 45). She
makes these claims due to her belief that men need to act more prudently with their
gametes than they currently do, because, according to Overall, women must take much
more responsibility for their gametes than men, due primarily to their biological position
in procreation. She suggests that men must have a greater responsibility for their gametes
than they presently do, and she even goes as far as saying men should be more
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responsible for their gametes than their other bodily parts and fluids, e.g. urine, feces,
blood, etc. For her, men just do not worry about the risks and realities of sexual activity;
whereas, women, housing the sexual organs that develop the fetus, must always be aware
of these risks.
These are some fairly strong claims against men’s lack of responsibility for their
gametes. Though she may be right that men may have a propensity to be more careless
with their gametes than women, she makes several assumptions that aren’t warranted.
First, her assumption that women are “aware of the risks and realities that are always
attendant upon even consensual sexual behaviors...” is mistaken (Overall 2012: 46).
When she speaks of risks and realities in this context, she only means unwanted
pregnancy, as opposed to sexually transmitted infections and things of that nature.
However, natural pregnancies only happen through sexual intercourse, so there are a
plethora of ways to behave sexually without the risks and realities of unwanted
pregnancies.
Second, this objection is also strengthened by her insistence that a man can
anticipate a possible pregnancy from oral sex. It’s reasonable to ask how this might be
possible, though. How can a man logically and accurately anticipate the possibility of a
pregnancy from oral sex when, barring some freak event, it is impossible to get pregnant
through oral sex? For many couples, oral sex is a type of birth control. Planned
Parenthood, a respected, nonprofit organization dedicated to sexual education and the
combat against unwanted pregnancies, even labels oral sex as a type of “outercourse”
birth control (Cullins 2014). It is not the safest type of birth control due to the possibility
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of contracting sexually transmitted infections; however, it still is 100 percent effective at
preventing pregnancy.
Some may object that the deceit used in the purloined sperm case proves that oral
sex is not 100 percent effective at preventing pregnancy. Granting this, though, one can
use this same type of reasoning to come to the conclusion that abstinence and celibacy
are also not 100 percent effective in their aims. Abstinence is advertised to be 100
percent effective at preventing pregnancy, but abstinence doesn’t forbid masturbation. If
someone secretly collects sperm after masturbation and impregnates herself with it, then,
under the same reasoning used above, abstinence is not 100 percent effective. Celibacy,
which forbids masturbation, must be the only 100 percent effective way to prevent
pregnancy then. However, it is possible for someone to use a syringe to extract sperm
from an individual in a deep sleep – a sleep that is either natural or induced by the thief –
and proceed to impregnate a woman with it. 4 To use a more common example, if a man
has a nocturnal emission, colloquially known as a “wet dream,” a woman can harvest the
semen and impregnate herself with it through this avenue as well. By the reasoning
above, then, celibacy would also not be 100 percent effective at preventing pregnancy,
which is obviously false. Farfetched as these examples might be, it shows the ludicrous
nature of this objection. From this I contend that oral sex is 100 percent effective at
preventing pregnancy, and no rational person would anticipate a pregnancy from it.
It also should be noted that the Illinois Appellate Court even supported this claim
in Phillips v. Irons. Though they didn’t believe it was conversion of property, their
4

There is actually a name for this procedure called Percutaneous Epididymal Sperm Aspiration or PESA.
It involves “inserting a needle attached to a syringe into the epididymis, then gently withdrawing fluid”
(Urology Care Foundation 2011). Obviously, the person would need to know what they are doing;
however, this positively shows that this is a genuine biological occurrence that could be performed.
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sentiment supported the claim that the inseminator could not rationally anticipate a
pregnancy through the means of oral sex. Talking about the purloined sperm case
directly, the judges claimed that the defendant “deceitfully engaged in sexual acts, which
no reasonable person would expect could result in pregnancy, to use plaintiff’s sperm in
an unorthodox, unanticipated manner yielding extreme consequences” (Turley 2011).
I can only think of two normal ways that one might anticipate a pregnancy from
oral sex: 1) you lack sexual education and are consequently ignorant about the biology of
sex and reproduction and think oral sex can impregnate someone, or 2) you are
excessively cynical. 5 The first way is granted immunity through Overall’s clause above,
because people in this group would most likely be young boys or the mentally impaired.
The second way, though, is plausible. One can imagine a man so cynical and distrustful
of human sincerity that he could anticipate a pregnancy occurring from oral sex, and I’m
sure there are real, concrete examples in the world that exemplify this. However, in
many other social areas of life, being this excessively cynical would have to be a great
hindrance to efficiency, prosperity, and happiness. If one is this cynical in a situation like
this, where you at least know enough about someone to let them perform oral sex on you,
then interactions with complete strangers must be exponentially worse.
For example, imagine that it is tax time, and the excessive cynic is in the market
for a new accountant. As awful and stressful as tax time is already, it would have to be
5

This, of course, is talking about an “Average Joe” type of character. Obviously, wealthy men and men
with specimens at sperm banks, specifically those with acquaintances who might have access to the
specimens, will have a greater need to be on the lookout for this type of scandalous behavior, because there
will likely be more attempts to steal sperm from these types of people due to their affluence and ease of
theft from the sperm bank. When it comes to this type of situation, a cynical attitude may be a virtue rather
than a vice. However, since the purloined sperm case does not explicitly stipulate the man as wealthy,
famous, or having specimens stored at a sperm bank, I’m going to assume he’s an average person with no
incentive to be on the lookout for these things.
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much worse dealing with this stressful time as an excessively cynical person. Since he
has a new accountant handling all of his private information, the excessive cynic would
probably be distraught with anxiety knowing that at any minute his identity could be
stolen by an untrustworthy person who is only motivated by his own interests. This type
of excessive cynicism can be extrapolated to many other social situations with similar
results, too, which points to the fact that this is not a feasible or productive way to live
one’s life. Furthermore, if, as Overall wishes, every man were able to be anticipatory and
“responsible” in this manner, then, consequently, every man would have to be this
excessively cynical. I’m not sure that this would be a productive, efficacious type of
society. Whether this is compelling or not, the burden of proof is on Overall, because her
claim questions both our intuitions on oral sex and our current understanding of human
reproduction. From my point of view, her defense of this controversial claim is not
acceptable and needs further justification for validity.6
One relevant objection that might be raised at this point is that my analysis
provides no clear line between extreme cynicism and responsible, risk-averse behavior.
Perhaps being weary of purloined sperm is simply responsible behavior rather than
excessive cynicism. Objections that deal with subjective concepts or definitions always
have some sort of strength, because it’s hard to know where “the line” is when so many
6

One might argue here that there is a stark difference between what is required by excessive cynicism in
my example and Overall’s example. In my example, excessive cynicism leads to lack of proper
functioning, and in Overall’s example it just leads to disposal of a condom. This is true, but any objection
based on this fact is due to a misconception of my argument. In order for the man to anticipate a possible
pregnancy from oral sex and thwart the purloining of the sperm himself, he must be that excessively
cynical in the first place. Therefore, the emphasis shouldn’t be on the differing results of excessive
cynicism between the two examples, because the examples are just two different scenarios in the life of the
excessive cynic. Rather, the emphasis should focus on the fact that the man who does anticipate pregnancy
from oral sex must be excessively cynical, which entails that he will also deal with the anxieties of social
situations that I labeled in my example. The objection is baseless.
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people define these terms differently. Responsible, risk-averse behavior can mean
wearing a seatbelt to one person and purely being sober while driving to another!
However, since I’ve established that oral sex is 100 percent effective at preventing
pregnancy, we are dealing with a certainty rather than a probability, and that should make
this objection a little easier to quell.
I must admit that in responding to this objection I will make an assumption
regarding the inseminator and gestator on the night of the purloined sperm. I am going to
assume that they were performing oral sex over intercourse as a method of birth control.
This is a fairly intuitive assumption, because if they were planning on having intercourse
in addition to oral sex, there would be no need to steal the sperm from oral sex. Much
easier ways of impregnating oneself without the man’s knowledge could have been
performed if they were to have intercourse in addition to oral sex, e.g. lying about taking
hormonal birth control, tampering with the condom, etc.
Though I do not think it is absolutely necessary to make this assumption, it
strengthens my argument and makes it clearer when everything is finished. Whether or
not they were using oral sex as a method of birth control, it has already been established
that the inseminator knew oral sex wouldn’t render the gestator pregnant, because, as
argued above, oral sex is 100 percent effective in preventing natural pregnancy.
Therefore, the inseminator was acting responsibly and averting risk by not risking
pregnancy through intercourse. Not only is he being responsible with regard to an
unwanted pregnancy, he’s also highly reducing his chances of catching a sexually
transmitted infection from the gestator. This is being responsible.
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Overall states, “No contraception is foolproof, and sexual activity, even
nonstandard sexual activity [read oral sex], can result in pregnancy” (Overall 2012: 45).
This isn’t right, though. I’ve already established that oral sex is effective at preventing
pregnancy, so if the inseminator knows that oral sex is 100 percent effective at preventing
pregnancy, then there is no need for him to take further precaution in preventing
pregnancy. Once something is 100 percent complete, it doesn’t make any sense to try to
go above and beyond 100 percent complete, because, in most cases, there is no beyond.
His aim is satisfied, and to try and take anymore precaution would be paranoid and
irrational – it’d be excessively cynical. An analogous counterexample will help here.
Imagine that you are supposed to be the designated driver for your friends tonight
on New Year’s Eve, and you know that hoards of police officers will be patrolling the
roads. You want to be responsible and avoid a DUI, so you choose not to drink any
alcohol at all. This is responsible, risk-aversive behavior. However, later on in the night,
you decide you don’t even want to risk driving sober at all, because you fear some police
officer will be deceitful and claim that you were intoxicated when you really weren’t.
Though not drinking alcohol is 100 percent effective against receiving a DUI, fear of
deceit from other authority figures and distrust of others drives you to act this way. This
is irrational, and it is analogous to the purloined sperm case. You act responsibly by your
first actions of oral sex and not drinking; you are paranoid, irrational, and excessively
cynical when you go further than that. This shows that in a lot of cases there is a
discernable line between being responsible and being excessively cynical, and to submit
to Overall’s suggestion in the case of the purloined sperm would be to put yourself on the
latter side of the two.
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On a final note, the substantial scarcity of these types of cases also lends support
to my argument. In the past half-decade, only a handful of purloined sperm cases have
been brought to court, and out of this handful virtually every case was alleged rather than
confirmed. This suggests that the degree of responsibility for a potential occurrence
should be weighed by the actual probability of that thing happening. For the scenario we
are dealing with, the degree of responsibility a man has for his gametes is correlated with
the probability of them being purloined, which is extremely low. On the contrary, if we
were talking about leaving one million dollars in cash or one hundred pounds of gold out
on the street unattended, the probability of them being stolen is extremely high.
Therefore, the low degree of responsibility that men should have towards the purloining
of sperm suggests that anticipating such an event is virtually impossible. If there is a low
degree of responsibility for an event of purloined sperm and anticipating it is virtually
impossible, it follows that men should not be held responsible in cases of purloined
sperm.

The Purloined Sperm Case: Blaming the Victim
While Overall’s aforementioned claims and assumptions are surely false, the main
flaw in the argument is her shift from the wellbeing of the child to the inseminator
“paying the price” for his actions. She explicitly makes this shift in two different places.
The first, stronger quote comes when she’s discussing the similarities between the
purloined sperm case and the hypothetical lab cases. She states, “...and they [the
inseminators] are responsible for their own negligence [emphasis added]” (Overall 2012:
46). The second quote comes in several subsections:
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Because of women’s role in gestation…it makes sense not to allow men off the
hook [emphasis added] when it comes to supporting the children they
father…for, as a general practice, it is important not to give the message to men
that they are not responsible for the consequences of their voluntary sexual
behavior [emphasis added] (Overall 2012: 47).

These quotes highlight her shift from the priority being solely the wellbeing of the
child to a derogatory insistence that the inseminator be responsible for the
“consequences” of his “negligence.” As shown above, being able to anticipate a
pregnancy from something other than intercourse requires an excessive cynicism, which
was shown to be impractical, irrational, and hardly feasible. Therefore, since I denied her
anticipatory claim, and she can’t provide a satisfactory one, the inseminator did not make
an autonomous, free choice to perform pregnancy-risking behavior, 7 and her labeling of
“negligent” and “off the hook,” which also implies some sort of negligence, is not
warranted.
For the sake of thoroughness, though, Overall could still argue that the
inseminator was reckless and negligent with his sperm, even though he couldn’t
rationally anticipate pregnancy from oral sex. However, since it wasn’t a pregnancyrisking behavior and there was no reason to suspect pregnancy from this, this argument
lacks any type of strength. This is analogous to claiming that the Schnucks customers in
2012 who had their credit cards hacked by internet hackers were acting negligently.
They used their cards correctly in a non-fraud-risking way8, so one wouldn’t say that they

7

As a minor note, pregnancy-risking behavior is opposed to the free choice of sexual behavior that Overall
talks about. The inseminator still chooses to act sexually with the woman; however, since I denied the
anticipatory claim, where the inseminator could anticipate a pregnancy from oral sex, the two come apart
and are separate concepts.
8

A smaller-chain of grocery stores is about as safe of a place to use a credit card as you can find. I contrast
it with fraud-risking behavior, such as randomly putting your credit card and social security number online.
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were acting negligently. They were merely products of deceit, just like the inseminator.
This objection is also analogous to saying that though a girl is not to blame for being
raped, she is to blame for being irresponsible in wearing a “provocative” top in a bad
neighborhood, which is preposterous.
Since labeling the inseminator as negligent is unwarranted, this entails that the
inseminator was nothing more than the victim of deceit. This means that Overall’s
argument now relies on victim-blaming to succeed. The psychological fallacy known as
blaming the victim, or victim-blaming, is defined as an instance, “...when the victim of a
crime or abuse is held partly or entirely responsible for the actions committed against
them. In other words, the victims are held accountable for the maltreatment they have
been subjected to” (Schoellkopf 2012: 2).

By holding the victims of deceit, the

inseminators, partly responsible for the pregnancy due to their alleged, but unfounded,
negligence, Overall is, by definition, victim-blaming.
An expert in victim-blaming, Julia Schoellkopf explores some of the main reasons
victim-blaming occurs. She states, “The main motivation for people to victim-blame is to
justify abuse or social injustice” (Schoellkopf 2012: 2). Though Overall does explicitly
state that she does not condone the deceit the gestator used to obtain the sperm, it does
seem that her victim-blaming is related to an attempt to justify the deceit and consequent
pregnancy, even though she tries to disguise this fact with the emphasis on the child’s
welfare.
Other reasons that some tend to victim-blame are due to faulty background
assumptions, ideologies, and attributions. There are two other substantial reasons that
some people victim-blame: the belief in a just world or errors in attribution. The just
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world hypothesis claims that the world is ultimately a just place. Good people always get
what they deserve, and bad people also get what they deserve. This hypothesis holds that
all of the social structures and systems are fair and just, especially to the subject who
holds this herself. People who victim-blame tend to hold this belief subconsciously,
perhaps as a hope or aspiration, because one can empirically verify that the world is not
always a just place. In fact, many cases of victim-blaming are implicit in this same sense,
and the subject does not necessarily understand that she is victim-blaming by her
emphasis on the victim of the crime (Kay, Jost, & Young 2005: 240-46).
When the subject sees a crime, then, she doesn’t see a victim who was taken
advantage of by a perpetrator of the law. Rather, she sees a person who couldn’t possibly
be wronged in such a malicious way, because the world is ultimately a just place. The
blame is then placed on the victim herself, and a lack of personal responsibility or flaw in
character is usually pointed to as the catalyst for the incident. This is a very naive
perspective of the world, but it is one of the main reasons that some people victim-blame.
Others have different motivations to victim-blame. Rather than believe in a just
world, other cases of victim-blaming are the result of an error in attribution. In this
sense, there are two types of attributions one can make about situations of crime: internal
and external. Internal attributions refer to when a situation is judged as a result of the
contents of the victim’s character; whereas, external attributions refer to when a situation
is judged as a result of the circumstances and environment surrounding the people
involved (Heider 1958). Victim-blaming occurs when people overvalue internal
attributes over more relevant external attributes, and they target the victim’s character
and choices as the object of blame over the actual circumstances of the crime itself.
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In Overall’s case, it could plausibly be argued that she implicitly holds this just
world hypothesis, but it is very apparent that her argument is the result of an error in
attribution. In the purloined sperm case, she makes an internal attribution error when she
blames the inseminator of negligence, and she devalues the overall circumstances and
environment of the case, i.e. the deceit employed by the gestator. Therefore, since
victim-blaming is widely known as fallacious and Overall’s argument rests on this fallacy
through an internal attribution error, we can conclude that Overall’s argument in the case
of the purloined sperm is unsound and is merely a case of victim-blaming.9
One possible objection that could be brought against this argument is that the
sperm is a gift for the gestator. This is the sentiment that the Illinois Appellate Court,
wrongly, expressed in Phillips v. Irons. They claimed “…that when the plaintiff
‘delivered’ his sperm, it was a gift – an absolute and irrevocable transfer of title to
property from a donor to a done. There was no agreement that the original deposit would
be returned upon request” (Phillips v. Irons 2005). If the sperm is a gift, then the sperm
would no longer be property of the inseminator, and, after ejaculation, the sperm would
be the property of the gestator. This objection is hardly compelling, though. The case is
of the purloined sperm, so it’s not apparent how stealing something could be construed as
tacit gift-giving. Gift giving is a purposeful, conscious measure that one completes with
a purpose and end in mind, which is generally the enjoyment of the gift by the receiver.

9

This argument might also be applicable towards other cases of deceit that result in unwanted pregnancy,
e.g. time of ovulation cycle, promise to use emergency contraception, deception about taking hormonal
birth control, etc. Though being fairly analogous to the purloined sperm case, they are somewhat more
difficult to argue for due to the fact that actual unprotected sexual intercourse did occur. With the
purloined sperm case, there should have been a 0 percent chance for pregnancy, so oral sex is a major
factor for my argument. However, I do not think this fact defeats this type of argument for those other
cases of deceit, and I think it will only need a fairly different approach to succeed.
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If the gestator stole the sperm unbeknownst to the inseminator, then it is not within the
concept of gift-giving. Suppose a friend is giving me a ride to the gas station, and,
unbeknownst to him, I steal his car when he goes inside. Calling this purloined car a gift
from my friend is mistaking the concept of gift-giving. The pure semantics of the title
“the case of the purloined sperm” ensure that the sperm is not a gift.
A similar objection can be made by the transfer of property rights of the sperm.
Objectors claim that upon ejaculation and disposal of the used condom to the gestator, the
property rights of the sperm were transferred from the inseminator to the gestator. This
objection is also highly dubious, because it seems to make mundane, everyday tasks
property rights transfers. For example, if property rights were this easily transferred
without consent (not even tacit consent!), then restaurant servers and valets could
potentially own thousands of credit cards and automobiles due to the reliance on property
rights transfers in their places of employment.
Another, more biologically relevant example would be cases such as the movie
Gattaca. In the movie Gattaca, a future society places a premium on superior genetic
code that can be cloned and manipulated before birth. Imagine that I’m shaking a
stranger’s hand, and the handshake left some of the stranger’s DNA on my hand, i.e.
sweat, skin cells, saliva, hair, etc. Would I be justified in making a clone of that stranger
from her DNA? If the objector’s sense of property rights transfers is sound, then, yes, I
would be justified, because by shaking my hand and leaving her DNA the stranger
transferred her property rights of her particular DNA to me. It may be objected that the
stranger did not make an autonomous choice in this interaction to leave her DNA, but
there is no real distinguishable difference between the actions of the stranger in this

Potter, Jordan G., 2014, UMSL, p. 19

example and the actions of the inseminator in the purloined sperm case. It is common
knowledge that you leave traces of DNA almost everywhere you go and on everything
you touch, so ignorance cannot be an excuse here. The fact is, they were both products of
thievery and deceit, and property rights, and gifts, aren’t truly transferred to different
ownership without voluntary knowledge and consent.

Claim Two: Child’s Interests and Sperm Donators
Though Overall’s third claim and argument for the purloined sperm case were
shown to be fallacious, her first two claims still stand. In particular, one could cite the
second claim - the child’s interests and well-being always trump the father’s interest in
not being a parent - as a good enough reason to proceed with Overall’s argument.
Though her irresponsibility and victim-blaming arguments are mistaken, it may be argued
that the innocent child should take precedence over the inseminator’s financial interests,
and he should still be financially liable for the child.
The problem with this sentiment is its one-sided emphasis of justice. It isn’t
justice to punish one innocent person for the sake of another, and the child’s interests
shouldn’t supersede the interests of the father due solely to the child’s youth. The child’s
welfare was only relevant when it was combined with the inseminator’s gamete
irresponsibility, which contributed greatly to the pregnancy. Since my argument showed
that the inseminator was not negligent or irresponsible with his gametes, the claim loses
strength. Rather than pitting an innocent child against a negligent inseminator, Overall’s
claim pits two innocent individuals against each other, and she claims that the child’s
interests trump those of the inseminator’s in virtue of the child’s youth and need to be
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cared for. This doesn’t logically follow without the inseminator’s supposed gamete
irresponsibility.
An analogous counterexample might help to further draw out the problem with
this claim. Suppose there is a single mother with a young child. She was just fired from
her job, and she has no way to support the welfare of her child. Suppose she is computer
savvy and has the ability to hack into a male friend’s Paypal account to wire some money
from his account to her account. She decides to hack into his account and acquire the
money, but she is caught during the money transfer. If, as this claim contends, the child’s
welfare is of the greatest importance, the male friend should be obligated to let her keep
the money for the child’s welfare. This is obviously false, because an innocent person
should not be obligated to care for his friend’s child that is in need. This is a
supererogatory moral act – an act that is viewed as noble and saintly but not morally
required. This case is similar to the purloined sperm case, so financial responsibility of a
bastard child from a case of purloined sperm should also be considered a supererogatory
act rather than obligatory act.
Obviously, there is one main difference between these examples. In the purloined
sperm case it is the biological father who is financially responsible for the child; whereas,
in the Paypal case it is merely a male friend who is being held financially responsible.
This might be a relevant difference, because it does seem intuitive that we are more
responsible for our biological children and relatives than non-related friends and
strangers. However, this distinction is deceptive in this case and may not be as relevant
as it seems to be. This is especially true in cases of sperm donations.
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If biological relation is that important to a child’s interests and welfare, then
sperm donors should also be financially responsible for the welfare of the children that
their sperm produces. Overall explicitly discusses sperm donation cases, and she claims
that they are a legitimate exception to the rule. She states:
Donor insemination is a legitimate exception; women who obtain donor
insemination acknowledge, in most cases, that the inseminator will have no
material or moral responsibility for the resulting child. The basis for this
exception is the formal prior agreement in writing, which is entered into freely,
autonomously, and informedly by both the gestator and the inseminator, that the
inseminator will be materially and morally detached from his offspring. The
significance of the “purloined sperm” cases, however, is that there is no prior
agreement whatsoever; hence, the male is not absolved of his responsibility
(Overall 2012: 43).

Overall argues that the formal agreement entered into before insemination makes
this case a legitimate exception. There are several issues with Overall’s perceived
dichotomy of the purloined sperm case and the sperm donation case in this instance.
Firstly, the inseminator in the purloined sperm case is never given the opportunity for a
formal prior agreement in writing, because he is not participating in a pregnancy-risking
behavior. As already argued, oral sex is 100 percent effective for preventing pregnancy;
therefore, there is no incentive for the inseminator to seek a formal agreement. Secondly,
it is the deceit and thievery of the gestator, unbeknownst to the inseminator, which
created the purloined sperm situation, so it was impossible for the inseminator to be
aware of the need for a formal prior agreement in writing beforehand. As already noted,
this makes him a victim of deceit and a victim of the circumstances. Also, since I’ve
shown how Overall’s claim of negligence is unwarranted, the inseminator is, thereby,
innocent within the case, and, due to the inseminator’s lack of opportunity, the prior
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formal agreement isn’t an overridingly relevant distinguishing factor between the two
cases.
This leaves us with two very similar cases. On the one hand, we have a
pregnancy resulting from theft and deceit, and the inseminator - the victim of the theft
and deceit - is financially and morally responsible for the impending child when he was
shown to have performed no wrong-doing. On the other hand, we have a pregnancy
resulting from a willful sperm donation, and the sperm donor is not financially or morally
responsible for the impending child due to a prior formal agreement that the purloined
sperm inseminator was never offered. This is not justice. Both of these men are innocent
men who did not commit any act of wrong-doing, so how does Overall justify making the
former financially responsible for the child and the latter not? As shown above, the
existence of a prior formal agreement shouldn’t be a distinguishing factor between the
two cases, because in the purloined sperm case the inseminator was never allowed the
opportunity to attain an agreement due to the deception and theft. 10 Therefore, it follows
that if the child’s interests and welfare supersede the interests of the inseminator, then
they should also supersede the interests of the sperm donor. This is obviously a
counterintuitive claim, and it makes this objection highly questionable and implausible. 11
10

One cannot argue here that he could have attained an agreement for the oral sex, because, as I’ve
previously argued, it is not a pregnancy-risking behavior. One could still argue that he could have attained
an agreement in case he somehow foresaw the purloined sperm case happening; however, he would then
necessarily need to attain prior agreements from any female capable of purloining his sperm after
masturbation or nocturnal emissions, which I’ve shown to be logically equivalent to purloining sperm from
oral sex. This is obviously ludicrous and virtually impossible, so the objection isn’t sustainable.
11

It should be noted that the previous argument against claim two in this case is only relevant to the cases
of prospective parent disagreement where deceit and/or theft is involved. In non-deceitful cases of
prospective parent disagreement, this argument doesn’t necessarily work. However, it will be apparent
how the second assumption is nullified in non-deceitful cases of disagreement after I address the problems
of procreative asymmetry in the next section.
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The fact of the matter is the purloined sperm situation is a case with no winners.
Short of purchasing purloined sperm insurance, everyone from the child to the
inseminator is probably going to end up losing something, and it might be irrational to
expect anything else in a case so fraught with deception. I contend that the inseminator
should not be financially responsible for the child, but, obviously, someone needs to be.
This is where religious institutions, charitable organizations, government agencies, and
other nonprofit organizations fill a role in society. They serve people in need that do not
qualify for most standard avenues of aid, and they also specialize in aiding those in
loophole/borderline cases and cases of extenuating circumstances, which I’m sure the
purloined sperm case would be considered. These institutions and organizations won’t be
able to help everyone, and the system is not perfect. However, there isn’t anything better
about making an innocent person responsible for the deceit of another.

Claim 1: Procreative Asymmetry
With the purloined sperm case settled, all that remains to discuss is the first two
claims in non-deceitful cases of prospective parent disagreement, which is what I will be
focusing on in this section.12 In both deceitful and non-deceitful cases of prospective
parent disagreement, there is a substantial asymmetry in the rights and powers of the
gestator versus those of the inseminator. When pregnant, prospective mothers do not
need to notify the prospective father of a planned abortion nor receive his consent to

12

It is important that I note that I’m solely focusing on non-deceitful cases of disagreement here, because
most of my arguments will assume that the parents will have some sort of discourse over their
disagreement. If I was discussing deceitful cases of disagreement, then I wouldn’t be able to assume that
the gestator would inform the inseminator in time for an abortion, or at all.
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receive an abortion, and this creates a substantial asymmetry between the rights of the
prospective mother and prospective father. Dien Ho labels this as procreative
asymmetry, and he claims that it arises out of the woman’s ability to “make unilateral
procreative decisions (insofar as they can legally choose, on their own, whether to
continue the pregnancy or abort), but men cannot because they can legally neither prevent
nor compel an abortion” (Ho 2008).
Ho claims that this asymmetry is unjustified due to a misunderstanding of the
difference between procreative autonomy and bodily autonomy. Bodily autonomy is
what entitles women “dominion over their bodies,” and this is what justifies abortion
when it is desired by both parties, according to Ho (Ho 2008). The gestator’s bodily
autonomy also prevents the inseminator from forcing an abortion on her. However, this
bodily autonomy does not give the gestator the right to make unilateral procreative
choices for the inseminator, because this violates his procreative autonomy. Procreative
autonomy is defined as a right to control one’s own role in procreation (Dworkin 1993).
The bodily autonomy of the gestator does not give her dominion over the inseminator’s
procreative right to control one’s own role in procreation. Ho states, “No one should be
allowed to make procreative decisions for another competent individual who is unwilling
to procreate” (Ho 2008). Furthermore, the unjustifiable nature of this asymmetry is
derived from our “justified moral commitment to both women’s and men’s equal moral
rights and duties” (Ho 2008).
Overall acknowledges this asymmetry, but she claims that it is justified due to the
nearly impossible nature of procreation to be symmetrical between the gestator and the
inseminator. Ideally, moral rights and duties would be equally distributed across both
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genders; however, Overall believes that it just isn’t feasible in procreation. For this
situation, “equality need not mean ‘sameness,’ and in the context of procreation sameness
is, in some respects at least, impossible” (Overall 2012: 41). She goes on to state:
A man, on the one hand, merely needs to produce viable sperm and be capable of
erection and ejaculation. A woman, on the other hand, must be able to produce
viable ova and sustain a pregnancy. Her body devotes nine months [emphasis
added] to the creation and nourishment of the fetus, after which she labors and
delivers the baby. The amount of work and physical and psychological
‘investment by the woman and the man, respectively, is staggeringly different in
quantity and quality [emphasis added]. Therefore, there should be no prima facie
assumption that in practice the reproductive rights and duties of women and must
be expressed in exactly the same way. (Overall 2012: 41-2)

For Overall, then, the time, energy, and contributions that women put in greatly
outweigh, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the time, energy, and contributions put in
by men, and this justifies the procreative asymmetry that is displayed in prospective
parent disagreement.
Though Overall is correct in stating that women contribute much more to
procreation than men, she is wrong in assuming that the procreative asymmetry inherent
in prospective parent disagreement is justified due to the asymmetry displayed in the
procreative workload of the gestator and inseminator during pregnancy, because she
mistimes the approximate date of disagreement. If the disagreement occurred at the birth
of the child, then her argument would be relevant. Usually, though, if disagreement
occurs, it happens much earlier in the pregnancy, so the asymmetry in the procreative
workload that she uses to justify the procreative asymmetry isn’t necessarily relevant.
To see why it isn’t relevant, one only needs to look at a study of the timeline of
abortions. In a study on abortions from 1969 to 1999, a group of researchers found the
following:
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1) Fifty-eight percent of all abortions for which gestational age was reported were
performed at <8 weeks of gestation.
2) Eighty-eight percent of all abortions were performed before 13 weeks of
gestations.
3) From 1992 (when the data was first collected) through 1999, there were marked
increases in the percentage of abortions performed at <6 weeks of gestation
[Presumably due to advances in pregnancy detection methods] (Elam-Evans,
Strauss, Herndon, Parker, Whitehead, Berg 2002: 1-2).
Most women find out that they’re pregnant during the fourth through eighth week of
gestation. Since the study states that the majority of women receive an abortion during or
before the eighth week of gestation, they must find out that they’re pregnant at least one
to two weeks before the abortion, which gives them time to mull over the decision, set up
an appointment, and receive any state-mandated counseling that may be required
beforehand. So I’ll posit that the average woman figures out that she is pregnant during
the sixth week of gestation.13
This seems to imply that the disagreement would occur in the sixth and seventh
weeks of gestation, before most women who decide to terminate actually have the
abortion. To be fair, though, only the majority, roughly sixty percent, have the abortion
before week eight, so she might be in the minority that has it in the time period between
eight and thirteen weeks of gestation. At any rate, I think it is fair to posit that if she was

13

I am assuming that the woman actually notifies the father of the pregnancy, because, otherwise, this
argument is irrelevant. I think this assumption is valid, though, because the whole issue surrounding this
chapter of Overall’s book is prospective parent disagreement. You can’t have Overall’s type of
disagreement in this situation without the man knowing that the woman is pregnant, so it seems necessary
that the gestator does notify the inseminator of her pregnancy.
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going to have an abortion it would be before the thirteenth week of gestation. This leaves
approximately seven weeks for the prospective parents to decide what to do – to keep the
baby or have an abortion.
This is relevant because Overall’s justification of the procreative asymmetry is
due to the asymmetry in the procreative workload. But if the procreative workload is not
as asymmetrical as Overall assumes, then it follows that the procreative asymmetry
should also not be as asymmetrical as it is. In the quote above, Overall suggests that the
mother, “devotes nine months [emphasis added] to the creation and nourishment of the
fetus, after which she labors and delivers the baby” (Overall 2012: 42). But why is this
relevant if the father does not want the child at weeks six and seven when the
“contributions” of the mother and father are only minimally different? Future, potential
contributions should not matter before they happen when a particular disagreement’s
outcome dictates whether the contributions actually obtain. In situations where both
parties have the same desire, yes, they do matter, but when one party does not want the
situation to obtain, I fail to see how the opposite party’s future, potential contributions are
relevant.
Let’s suppose that my girlfriend and I are invited to host my work Christmas
party. Hosting a work Christmas party is an honor at my place of employment, and we
signed up many years ago and are just now getting our chance to host. When I start to
discuss this issue with my girlfriend, we discover that I changed my mind and don’t want
to host it anymore, but she still does. For the example’s sake, let’s say that she will be
fully responsible for hosting the party and getting everything ready, which is more time
and energy that she contributes to the task than me. This creates an asymmetric workload.
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It doesn’t follow that these future, potential contributions would give her the right to
ultimately decide whether or not we host the party in the first place, because those
contributions are contingent on throwing the party.
In fact, it seems to be the exact opposite; rather than have a positive sense of the
right towards asymmetrical power, it seems that she only has a negative sense of the
right. Her potential, future contributions do not give her a positive right to allow these
contributions and hardships to obtain. Her potential, future contributions only give her a
negative right to not allow these contributions and hardships to obtain. Future
contributions and future asymmetrical workloads, then, would only imply a right to deny
the party rather than welcome it.
This example is analogous to prospective parent disagreement. Future, potential
contributions and asymmetrical workloads of the gestator would only seem to be relevant
in cases of her denying or preventing those sufferings rather than welcoming them or
keeping the pregnancy. So she would be on powerful grounds in the opposite case of
prospective parent disagreement – when the gestator doesn’t want to keep the baby but
the inseminator does. However, the future asymmetric workload of the gestator is
irrelevant in cases of disagreement when the gestator does want the baby and the
inseminator does not. This means that at the time of disagreement there is no substantial
asymmetry between the procreative workloads of the gestator and inseminator, and this
asymmetry can no longer be used to justify procreative asymmetry. This proves that
Overall’s first claim is false, and the procreative asymmetry displayed in prospective
parent disagreement is unjustified.
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Before shifting focus to the solution to this problem, I must note that there is still
an asymmetry between the procreative workloads of the gestator and inseminator at the
time of disagreement – a smaller asymmetry but an asymmetry nonetheless. Earlier I
noted that I would grant for my argument that the abortion could happen up to the
thirteenth week of gestation, and this aligns well with the ending of the first trimester of
pregnancy. In the first trimester, the gestator regularly experiences the following: nausea,
dizziness, mood swings, heartburn, constipation, swollen breasts, general fatigue, and
vaginal discharge. Also, in the first trimester, the fetus also grows and changes
substantially, though the first trimester pales in comparison in fetal growth and
maturation to the second two trimesters. The inseminator does not have to experience
any of these factors (though he may counter that he has it worse off by having to deal
with the gestator during this time!), and this creates the smaller asymmetrical procreative
workload between the two. This smaller asymmetry is crucial to the solution of the
problem.

The Solution to Procreative Asymmetry
Since Overall’s first claim is unsound, there is in fact a need to have a, somewhat,
symmetrical relationship between the rights and autonomy of the inseminator and
gestator in prospective parent disagreement. As Overall notes, though, it is almost
impossible to create a fully symmetrical relation between the rights and autonomy of both
parties, so we must settle to be as symmetrical as possible. We must therefore strive for
the following: 1) respect the bodily autonomy of both the gestator and inseminator, but
specifically the gestator, 2) respect the procreative autonomy of both the gestator and
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inseminator, but specifically the inseminator, and 3) respect the genetic rights each party
has over their share of the genetic material that compromises the fetus.
As Ho noted earlier, the bodily autonomy of the gestator allows her to have an
abortion, if she so desires. Her bodily autonomy also makes it impermissible for the
inseminator to force her to have an abortion, so it is inevitable for the gestator to have
near unilateral control over the actual decision of abortion. In prospective parent
disagreement, the bodily autonomy of the inseminator is a non-issue, because it has no
relevance to any potential outcomes.
Since we’re discussing this particular manifestation of prospective parent
disagreement, though, the procreative autonomy of the inseminator is relevant. Though
he cannot control the decision of abortion, his procreative autonomy ensures that he has
some sort of control in his role of procreation. It then follows that if he does not want to
become a parent, his right to procreative autonomy allows him to make this choice.
Furthermore, since he cannot force an abortion, all responsibilities that he may have
towards the child should be voided upon this decision, should the gestator continue with
the pregnancy. This action would respect both parties’ right to procreative autonomy.
As promised earlier, it can now be displayed how Overall’s second claim is
unsound in cases of non-deceitful prospective parent disagreement. Overall’s second
claim is that the child’s interests and well-being always trump the father’s interest in not
being a parent. Firstly, a child’s future interests and welfare cannot supersede the
inseminator’s fundamental right to procreative autonomy. Interests and welfare cannot
violate people’s rights without some further consideration. Secondly, with the need to
have a symmetrical relationship in the rights of procreative autonomy a premium, it is
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clear that if we are to respect the gestator’s procreative autonomy we must also respect
the inseminator’s procreative autonomy. Therefore, the child’s interests and welfare
cannot violate the inseminator’s right to procreative autonomy without also violating the
gestator’s right to procreative autonomy. Thirdly, if the child’s interests and welfare did
violate both parties’ right to procreative autonomy, this would work against the interests
of the child. Since the gestator wants to keep the fetus, violating her right to procreative
autonomy would put the pregnancy in danger, which seems counterproductive to the
child’s interests and welfare.
Even after these arguments, it still might seem that the inseminator is getting off
pretty easily. Though one may agree that his procreative autonomy must be respected,
the thought of the inseminator leaving the gestator to raise the baby alone is a little
disconcerting.
It must first be noted that the gestator is not necessarily bound to have the child
after the inseminator’s decision. To respect her procreative and bodily autonomy, she
still can decide to abort, as long as it’s still within the legal time frame set by the state.
This is a perfectly legitimate alternative. Furthermore, since the onus of the child’s
interests and welfare falls solely on the gestator, she must think prudentially about this
decision and the child’s interests in being raised by a single mother.
If she does still want to keep the baby, though, then it can be argued that the
voiding of all inseminator responsibility is also warranted due to the genetic rights that
the inseminator is completely signing over to the mother with his decision. In addition to
bodily and procreative autonomy, humans have a right to their genetic material and
specific genome. Before the fetus reaches the point of personhood, the arbitrary point
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where the state suggests that the fetus gains a right to life and abortion is no longer
permitted, it is generally considered an amalgamation of cells that is comprised of the
genetic material of both the inseminator and gestator. Both parents contribute exactly
fifty percent of the genetic material that comprises the amalgamation of cells, so they
both have genetic rights to half of the impending child. Since human biology is divided
into sexes and the bodily autonomy of the gestator prevents a forced abortion, an
inseminator who does not want his genetic material to actually obtain in a child is having
his genetic rights violated. I suggest that along with his right to procreative autonomy, it
is his genetic rights that make the voiding of all his responsibility to the child permissible.
Some may argue that it should be taken a step further with some sort of
“sperm/genetic alimony” payment(s) from the gestator to the inseminator for violating his
genetic rights. They argue that eighteen years of no responsibility for a child is not
comparable to a lifetime of one’s genetic rights violated. 14 These objections seem to be
overreaching. Yes, there will be some inseminators who would adamantly prefer the
abortion of their child over choosing to not raise it on their own, and this would create a
substantial violation of their procreative autonomy and genetic rights. However, the
USDA has recently estimated the, very conservative, cost of raising a child to the age of
eighteen at approximately $250,000 (Lino 2013: 21). That is a very large number, and,
assuming an equitable share of the expenses, the voiding of financial responsibility for
eighteen years would be approximately $125,000. Furthermore, I mentioned in the last
section that a small asymmetry in procreative workload still existed in the first trimester

14

This refers to the lifetime that the inseminator’s specific genome comprises the unwanted child. For
someone who did not want to reproduce or his “seed” or “own blood” to be raised by another, this might be
a substantial violation.
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of pregnancy. The combination of this asymmetry with the voiding of approximately
$125,000 of financial responsibility is sufficient to compensate the inseminator for the
violation of his genetic rights and respecting of his procreative autonomy. So in no way
does it seem that sperm/genetic alimony payments are needed to satisfy the violation of
the genetic rights of the inseminator, and both the inseminator and gestator are well
compensated in their rights, respect, and autonomy.
On a final note, I should remind the reader that this dynamic is not just to benefit
the inseminator. My argument works equally well for gestators as inseminators. In both
deceitful cases and non-deceitful cases of prospective parent disagreement, the gestator’s
procreative autonomy must be respected, and she should not be responsible for any
decision that violates her procreative autonomy. These types of situations rarely obtain,
though, due to the power of the gestator’s bodily autonomy in prospective parent
disagreement. These types of situations for gestators arise mostly in same-sex
relationships, and it might be an issue we face more in the future with the possibility of
ectogenesis. However, as previously stated, gestators contain the same rights and
autonomy as inseminators, and they should be treated as such.

Conclusion
To conclude, though Overall’s argument sounds compelling, her claims prove too
bold to stand up to scrutiny, and her arguments are found wanting. A procreator’s rights
and autonomy must be respected, and this is most clear in prospective parent
disagreement. Symmetry between the sexes is a virtue that we are hardly afforded, but it
is a crucial end that we must continually strive for if we ever plan on reaching true gender
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equality. Though Overall thinks it is virtually impossible, there is no better place to
begin our march towards true gender equality and symmetry than through addressing the
many problems of prospective parent disagreement.
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